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HOW THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ANTI-BOYCOTT
LEGISLATION AND THE EXPRESSIVE RIGHTS OF
BUSINESS ENDANGERS CIVIL RIGHTS AND
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
Debbie Kaminer *
David Rosenberg **
INTRODUCTION
More so perhaps than at any time in recent American history,
social and political activists are calling for boycotts of people, products, and even states and nations as a way to bring about change.
The tactic has been particularly visible during the years of polarization following the 2016 presidential election and has continued
during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. As in the past, the
promoters of boycotts span the political spectrum.1 Among the
most prominent boycotts during the last several years has been the
attempt to isolate Israel through the Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions movement (commonly known as “BDS”).2 This movement—and the attempts to combat it—have created a near-perfect
* Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College (CUNY). J.D., Columbia
University School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. This Article greatly benefitted
from discussion with colleagues at the 2019 Annual Academy of Legal Studies in Business
Conference and with participants on the panel “Anti-Boycott Legislation and the Expressive
Rights of Businesses: The Ethics and Legality of State Laws that Combat the BDS Movement,” hosted by the Robert Zicklin Center for Corporate Integrity in April 2020. All errors
are our own.
** Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Robert Zicklin Center for Corporate
Integrity, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College (CUNY).
1. Most boycotts focus on a single issue, many of which represent some of the most
polarizing areas of public disagreement. Since 2010, activists have called for consumers to
shun such entities as Chick-fil-A, Target, and the State of North Carolina because of policies
that they view as homophobic or transphobic. Similarly, activists have also called for boycotts of Nike and the NFL itself over Colin Kaepernick’s protest during the playing of the
National Anthem at football games. See Jacey Fortin & Matthew Haag, After Colin Kaepernick’s Nike Deal, Some Salute Swoosh, Others Boycott It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/sports/nike-protests-kaepernick-nfl-.html [https://perma.cc/
3XHJ-Y9C2].
2. Several commentators have noted, both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic,
that Israeli scientific research and technological innovations have made great contributions
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storm of competing rights and values that encapsulates one of the
great contradictions in contemporary American society: the conflict
between personal freedoms and efforts to end bigoted and discriminatory behavior by commercial businesses.
This Article examines how opponents of anti-BDS laws may extend First Amendment rights in the business context to a point at
which they actually threaten the validity of much antidiscrimination legislation. Part I discusses the BDS movement and statebased initiatives that attempt to penalize businesses that actively
engage in a boycott of Israel. It examines the handful of cases in
which federal courts have addressed the constitutionality of laws
that require state contractors to affirm that they are not actively
boycotting that country. Part II transitions to a discussion of the
ways the Supreme Court has historically resolved conflicts between antidiscrimination laws and the constitutional rights of freedom of association and expression, and notes a transition from deference to enforcement of such laws to a recognition of the
expressive rights of individuals and groups in both noncommercial
and commercial contexts. The Article concludes in Part III with an
application of the existing jurisprudence to state anti-BDS laws
and highlights the dangers that successful opposition to such laws
might present to the continued viability of antidiscrimination laws.
It concludes that affirmation of the expressive rights of pro-BDS
businesses could lead to serious challenges to the constitutionality
of laws designed to prevent bigotry in the conduct of commercial
affairs—including the landmark civil rights laws of the 1960s.

to the world, including to the lives of those calling for a boycott. See Stuart Winer, BDSSupporting Rashida Tlaib Uses Israeli Tech for Her Personal Website, TIMES ISR. (Feb. 20,
2019), https://www.timesofisrael.com/bds-supporting-rashida-tlaib-uses-israeli-tech-for-her
-personal-website/ [https://perma.cc/D24U-N3SN]. Indeed, in the early days of the pandemic, there was speculation that supporters of BDS would have to decide whether to honor
the boycott or to take steps to protect their own health and to help end the health crisis
facing the world, were Israeli scientists to succeed in developing a COVID-19 vaccine or
treatment. See, e.g., Algemeiner Staff, BDS Leader Widely Mocked for Saying It’d Be Ok to
Take Israeli-Developed Coronavirus Vaccine, ALGEMEINER (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.alge
meiner.com/2020/04/07/bds-leader-widely-mocked-for-saying-itd-be-ok-to-take-israeli-devel
oped-coronavirus-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/R6EA-XRYZ]. Although the most promising
vaccines have been developed elsewhere, the dilemma will almost certainly arise in some
other context in the future.
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I. BOYCOTTS AND THE BDS MOVEMENT
Throughout American history, activists have used commercial
and cultural boycotts to promote political and social change. Indeed, the refusal to engage in certain business dealings helped
bring about the American Revolution itself, the civil rights advances of the 1950s and 1960s, and the overthrow of South African
apartheid, among other events.3 Respecting the importance of boycotts in our history, American courts have usually viewed such protests as the exercise of a right which the framers of the Constitution intended to protect.4 Such cases have typically recognized the
right to boycott where it is used to express a point of view or to
bring about a political goal and not when it is used for commercial
purposes.5 However, where the boycott takes place in the realm of
business—where the boycotter has a commercial interest—the
right is more easily subjected to government regulation.6
A. The Rise of BDS
Over the last twenty years or so, activists in the United States
and elsewhere have begun to call for protests against the State of
Israel through a variety of means, including a boycott of the country.7 The movement has become known to supporters, opponents,
3. See Michael Livingston, Q&A: Here’s When Boycotts Have Worked—and When They
Haven’t, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-boycotts-history20180228-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/8WAX-QJQL].
4. The Supreme Court has affirmed that many commercial boycotts are protected as
free speech by the Constitution. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–
08 (1982).
5. In Claiborne, for example, the boycotters engaged in their refusal to deal as consumers, not as proprietors of commercial businesses; their boycott was simply a form of
political expression and did not take place in the context of their role as businesspeople. See
id. at 914.
6. For example, the Supreme Court has limited the rights to engage in commercial
boycotts in specific situations where it might constitute an unfair labor practice under the
National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456
U.S. 212, 225–26 (1982). Further, numerous federal laws prohibit compliance with boycotts
against U.S. allies led by foreign governments and businesses. Among these is the law prohibiting cooperation with a foreign country’s boycott of Israel that was initially passed in
1979, but now exists in the form of the Anti-Boycott Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. § 4842.
7. While the BDS movement claims 2005 as its official inception, critics assert that it
arose from the notorious UN-sponsored “World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance” which took place in Durban, South Africa, in
2001. Alexander B. Traum, Applied Anti-Semitism: The BDS Movement and the Abuse of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 34 TOURO L. REV. 1025, 1028–29 (2018). As Traum points
out, although the conference was billed as “a collective global response to racism, [it] ironically and sadly, devolved into an anti-Semitic hate-fest.” Id. at 1029. Most organizations
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and the media as “BDS” because its tactics include boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against various interests associated with Israel itself. While there is a formal umbrella organization that ostensibly leads the BDS movement,8 its adherents are not uniform
in their ideology, methods, or goals. What they all have in common
is an attempt to bring about change to benefit the Palestinians by
imposing economic and other kinds of pressure (cancellation of concert tours by pop stars, avoidance of academic conferences involving Israel or Israelis, and some occasionally high-profile forfeits of
sporting contests) on the State of Israel. 9
The precise focus of BDS’s commercial boycott is ambiguous. The
BDS movement states that its boycott “involve[s] withdrawing support . . . from all Israeli and international companies engaged in
violations of Palestinian human rights.” 10 Whether this is a call for
the boycott only of companies that operate in the Occupied Territories, a boycott of all companies doing business in Israel as a whole
or a much broader boycott of companies that might somehow benefit Israel is not entirely clear. Finally, the goals of the BDS movement are also varied. For some BDS advocates, the objective is to
bring about a two-state solution as fast as possible; for others the
goal is to destroy the Jewish state and replace Israel with a Palestinian state in the land currently consisting of Israel, Gaza, and
the West Bank.11 Finally, the BDS movement is frequently labelled
that take an anti-BDS stand also point to Durban as the starting point of the movement.
See, e.g., BDS: The Global Campaign to Delegitimize Israel, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/bds-the-global-campaign-to-delegitimize-isra
el [https://perma.cc/ZXN9-KLSB].
8. Marc A. Greendorfer, The Inapplicability of First Amendment Protections to BDS
Movement Boycotts, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 112, 113–14. The group’s website can
be found at https://bdsmovement.net/ [https://perma.cc/XGK2-LZJT]. Another commentator
describes the BDS movement in a way that suggests little formal organization: “The BDS
movement is a loose coalition of individuals and institutions, some private, others statesponsored, that seek to impose economic punishment on Israel for its alleged mistreatment
of the Palestinians.” Traum, supra note 7, at 1028.
9. See Timothy Cuffman, Note, The State Power to Boycott a Boycott: The Thorny Constitutionality of State Anti-BDS Laws, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 115, 122–23 (2018). The
academic, cultural, and athletic targeting of BDS certainly accounts for much of its power
to grab headlines. This Article, however, will focus on the commercial aspect of the boycott
because that is the area in which the conflict with the traditional justification of antidiscrimination laws arises.
10. What is BDS?, BDS, https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds [https://perma.cc/P6GCYF4R].
11. This is perhaps the most politically loaded issue that divides pro- and anti-BDS
commentators. The official BDS statement is bold but almost certainly deliberately ambiguous. Traum, supra note 7, at 1030. It states three demands from Israel: “1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall; 2. Recognizing the
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anti-Semitic because it singles out the world’s only Jewish country
for disproportionate criticism12 and because some supporters use
classic anti-Jewish tropes reminiscent of Nazi propaganda.13
B. Anti-BDS Legislation
Despite the zeal of its BDS movement, the United States is, in
fact, among the most pro-Israel countries in the world. The United
States government consistently supports Israel on the international stage, where many countries are extremely hostile to the
Jewish state. This has included economic assistance, military cooperation, and diplomatic support. While the Constitution explicitly endows only the federal government with the power to conduct
foreign policy, the overwhelming support for the State of Israel in
many regions has led numerous states to pass legislation or executive orders designed to combat the BDS movement. These laws
vary somewhat among the states, but most simply require that any
business that contracts with the state verify that it does not boycott
Israel.14 Their purpose was summarized succinctly by New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo: “If you boycott Israel, New York will
boycott you.”15
Almost all of the state anti-BDS laws are careful to avoid sanctioning pure speech that is merely critical of Israel. Such laws
fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and 3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes
and properties as stipulated in U.N. resolution 194.” Lindsey Lawton, A New Loyalty Oath:
New York’s Targeted Ban on State Funds for Palestinian Boycott Supporters, 42 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 649, 659 (2019). While demands two and three are fairly easily understood, demand one is open to broad interpretation. Many BDS supporters regard all of the
current State of Israel (in addition to the West Bank and Gaza) as occupied territory and
are plainly calling for its wholesale dismantling. If read as less extreme, the statement could
simply mean the withdrawal of Israeli settlements and forces from the West Bank and an
end to Israel’s partial closure of Gaza (which it, along with Egypt on Gaza’s southern border,
has held in place for many years).
12. Lawton, supra note 11, at 660.
13. The Israeli government has published an illustrated report that includes many depictions of Israel in ways plainly reminiscent of Nazi-era material designed to stir hatred
against Jews. MINISTRY OF STRATEGIC AFFAIRS & PUB. DIPLOMACY, STATE OF ISR., BEHIND
THE MASK: THE ANTISEMITIC NATURE OF BDS EXPOSED 55–68 (2019).
14. One commentator has described these as “Contract-focused laws” in order to distinguish them from other anti-BDS laws that focus solely on how a state invests its own money,
for example, its pension funds. Cuffman, supra note 9, at 129.
15. Andrew Cuomo, Gov. Andrew Cuomo: If You Boycott Israel, New York State Will
Boycott You, WASH. POST (June 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/govandrew-cuomo-if-you-boycott-israel-new-york-state-will-boycott-you/2016/06/10/1d6d3acc-2
e62-11e6-9b37-42985f6a265c_story.html [https://perma.cc/CSH6-SA43].
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would plainly violate the First Amendment. Rather, these laws are
typically designed to prohibit the state from contracting with companies that actively “boycott” Israel or businesses and institutions
connected with that country. This deliberately precise drafting of
legislation is clearly intended to place anti-BDS laws in the realm
of regulation of commercial activity and not traditionally protected
expression. Further, state anti-BDS laws now typically only apply
to businesses themselves and not to the personal or private conduct
of those forming the business or working on its behalf. Indeed, several states have been forced to amend their anti-BDS laws so that
they do not apply to people contracting with a state via a business
organized as a sole proprietorship.16
C. State Anti-BDS Laws in the Courts
Since 2018, federal courts have heard a small handful of cases
challenging the constitutionality of state anti-BDS laws.17 These
courts disagree largely based on their interpretation of two important Supreme Court cases that addressed the legality of certain
boycotts. Those courts that found the state laws unconstitutional
relied most heavily on Claiborne, which firmly established that advocacy of boycotts is protected by the First Amendment where the
purpose of the boycott is political and not commercial: “While
States have broad power to regulate economic activity, we do not
find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such
as that found in the boycott in this case.”18 The Court took pains to
note that the government may of course regulate commercial activity in myriad ways, but it may not outright prohibit promotion
of boycotts of businesses that are designed to make a political statement.19 The decision is ambiguous, however, regarding whether or

16. See infra notes 27–63 and accompanying text. It is important to note that these laws
do not prohibit businesses generally from discriminating based on a protected category. Rather, they are focused quite narrowly and only apply to state contractors–companies that
wish to enter into commercial contracts with states while simultaneously actively engaging
in BDS.
17. See, e.g., Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 717 (W.D. Tex.
2019); Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617 (E.D. Ark. 2019); Jordahl v. Brnovich,
336 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2018); Koontz v. Watson, 283 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (D. Kan. 2018).
18. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912–13 (1982).
19. Id.
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not such protection extends to the conduct associated with a boycott itself: the actual refusal to engage in commercial dealings with
certain businesses.
The one court that has found a state anti-BDS law to be constitutional, however, relies instead on a case decided just before
Claiborne, International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied International, Inc., in which the Supreme Court upheld sanctions against
a labor union for engaging in a boycott by longshoremen who refused to unload ships doing business with the Soviet Union.20 The
Court held that such conduct was a refusal to deal and not protected pure expression.21 The decision hinged on the Court’s characterization of the labor union’s action as a “secondary boycott,” a
tactic that the National Labor Relations Act intended to regulate.22
Subsequent cases and most commentators have typically held that
the International Longshoremen’s precedent is limited to conflicts
arising in the context of organized labor.23
Further, central to most of the recent decisions on anti-BDS laws
was each court’s approach to the precedent set in Rumsfeld v. FAIR
in which the Supreme Court held that the federal government did
not violate a law school’s right to free speech by sanctioning the
school for refusing to host military recruiters on its campus.24 The
Court held that requiring the law school to accommodate such recruitment was not an infringement of the school’s freedom of expression because the mere provision of rooms and distribution of
information is not “compelled speech.”25 Crucially, the Court insisted that the law school’s actions of hosting did not, on its own,
convey a message; rather, its meaning can only be understood “by
the speech that accompanies it,” and the Court was by no means
prohibiting the law school’s expression of ideas.26
In Koontz v. Watson, a 2018 case that led the Kansas legislature
to revise its anti-BDS law, the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas granted a preliminary injunction barring the

20. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 214, 226 (1982).
21. Id. at 222, 226.
22. Id. at 223–24.
23. See, e.g., Note, Boycotting a Boycott: A First Amendment Analysis of Nationwide
Anti-Boycott Legislation, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1301, 1323 (2018).
24. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 70
(2006).
25. Id. at 62.
26. Id. at 66.
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state from denying the plaintiff, a “curriculum coach at a public
school,” a contract based on her refusal to certify that she was not
participating in a boycott of Israel.27 The court held that the Supreme Court’s analysis of the expressive nature of the boycott in
Claiborne was entirely applicable to Koontz’s efforts to bring about
change in Israel and Palestine through her decision to refrain from
purchasing Israeli products.28 The court explained that because
Koontz’s boycott was designed “to express . . . dissatisfaction with
Israel and to influence governmental action,” the government
could not impose a sanction on it under its power to regulate economic activity.29
The Kansas district court distinguished Koontz’s denial of employment by the state based on her commitment to BDS from the
federal government’s denial of funding to the law school in FAIR
because of the school’s boycott of military recruiters on its campus.30 The distinction hinges on the holding in FAIR that the law
school’s conduct “is not inherently expressive” because people
would not understand the message conveyed by the absence of military recruiters without further explanation from the school itself.31 In Koontz, the court said that “[i]t is easy enough to associate
plaintiff’s conduct with the message that the boycotters believe Israel should improve its treatment of Palestinians. And boycotts—
like parades—have an expressive quality.”32
In the wake of the district court’s ruling in favor of a preliminary
injunction, Kansas amended its anti-BDS law to narrow its application in several ways. Most relevant to the original complaint, the
law no longer requires compliance by individuals or sole proprietors such as Ms. Koontz.33 Koontz’s lawsuit was dismissed following the amendment to the law, but the state was ordered to pay

27. 283 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1012–13 (D. Kan. 2018).
28. Id. at 1021–22.
29. Id. at 1022.
30. Id. at 1023–24.
31. Id. (citing FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65–66).
32. Id. at 1024. The reference to parades by the court is plainly a comparison of BDS to
the St. Patrick’s Day parade at issue in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the
organizers of a parade could not be forced to include a gay group among participants because
to do so would affect the message that the parade was intended to convey. Id. at 559. For a
discussion of Hurley, see infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
33. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3740f (amending 2017 Kan. Sess. Laws 1126 § 2(a) by replacing “individual or company” with “company.”).
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her upwards of $40,000 in legal expenses.34 The ACLU, which represented Koontz, nonetheless claims that the law’s infirmities remain: “While the changes reduce the number of people required to
sign the anti-boycott certification, the fundamental purpose of the
law—to suppress political boycotts of Israel and chill protected expression—remains unconstitutional.”35
Another similar lawsuit challenging a state’s anti-BDS legislation also resulted in an amendment to the law that narrowed its
scope considerably. In Jordahl v. Brnovich, the plaintiff was an attorney who contracted with an Arizona county to provide legal services to inmates.36 He was therefore asked, pursuant to Arizona’s
anti-BDS law, to affirm that neither he nor his company would “engage in a boycott of Israel.”37 Although Jordahl made such an affirmation in 2016, he refused to do so in 2017.38 He then brought a
lawsuit seeking to enjoin the state from enforcing the requirements
of the law.39
After finding that Jordahl had standing to bring the case, the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona addressed
his motion for a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of
success on the merits of the claim that the law’s certification requirement violates the First Amendment.40 The court emphasized
34. Lawsuit Dismissed Over Kansas Anti-BDS Law; State to Pay Plaintiff’s Legal Fees,
TIMES ISR. (July 1, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/lawsuit-dismissed-over-kansasanti-bds-law-state-to-pay-plaintiffs-legal-fees/ [https://perma.cc/U3ZR-UWKE].
35. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Withdraws from Free Speech Lawsuit Against Law
Requiring Contractors to Sign Document Promising Not to Boycott Israel (June 29, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/after-court-defeat-kansas-changes-law-aimed-boycottsisrael [https://perma.cc/R8MR-6GNE]. It remains to be seen whether subsequent courts will
determine the constitutionality of the revised Kansas law based on the nature of the business entity engaging in the boycott. The Supreme Court has in the past extended certain
rights to businesses based on their status as privately held rather than publicly held corporations, at least partly because such businesses are more easily identified with individual
human beings. See David Rosenberg, The Corporate Paradox of Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 308, 315–16 (2017). The more a court regards a boycott as
a First Amendment right, the more likely it will be to take seriously the claims of individual
plaintiffs in cases calling into question the constitutionality of state anti-BDS legislation.
36. 336 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2018).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1030.
40. Id. at 1034. Interestingly, in the discussion of standing, the court cited Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010), for the proposition that “corporations . . . do not
lose their First Amendment protections simply because they are not natural persons.” Jordahl, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1032. Other courts addressing anti-BDS laws have typically not
emphasized that case but rather focused on the specific right to boycott in their discussion
of the First Amendment implications of anti-BDS laws.
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that the International Longshoremen’s precedent was not applicable because that ruling is confined to boycotts engaged in by labor
unions.41 Instead, the court emphasized that the ruling in
Claiborne governed the case: “Claiborne stands for the proposition
that collective boycotting activities undertaken to achieve social,
political or economic ends is conduct that is protected by the First
Amendment.”42 Thus, the central issue for the court was “whether
the Arizona legislature has infringed upon or restricted these types
of boycotting activities.”43
The court parsed the language of the statute at issue in order to
show that it prohibits not just individual boycotts—which might
not receive First Amendment protection—but also “collective conduct” that is taken with the aim of achieving a common end, in this
case a boycott of Israel.44 The court took pains to show that Jordahl’s actions were part of a broader movement in order to distinguish the case from FAIR. Indeed, without a connection to others,
the court said, Jordahl’s refusal to buy Israeli products would lack
the expressive quality required to fall under the First Amendment’s protection.45 The court concluded, though, that such a connection did exist and granted Jordahl’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.46
Additionally, the court addressed the right of government employers to limit the speech of their employees where it relates to
their official duties, a right that the Supreme Court upheld in Pickering v. Board of Education.47 Drawing on that decision, the Jordahl court said that restrictions by the government on the speech
of its employees should be analyzed to determine “whether the restriction reaches only speech within the scope of a public employee’s official duties, and whether it impacts speech on matters

41. Jordahl, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1041.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1042.
45. The court explains that a refusal to buy, for example, an HP printer does not convey
a message unless “explanatory speech accompanies it.” Id. This draws directly on the Supreme Court’s decision in FAIR in which it found no suppression of free speech because the
mere act of refusing to host military recruiters on campus did not convey a message unless
it was accompanied by explanatory speech. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
Since the law at issue in FAIR did not directly ban protected conduct, it did not run afoul of
the First Amendment.
46. Jordahl, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1044, 1051.
47. 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
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of public concern.”48 The court found that Jordahl’s participation in
a boycott of Israel had no “plausible relationship” to his duties as
an attorney providing criminal defense for clients in jail.49 It also
found that his boycott of Israel plainly related to a matter of public
concern: the actions of Israel in relation to Palestine.50 This decision, however, was rendered moot when Arizona amended the law
so that it applies only to “(1) companies with ten or more full-time
employees, and (2) contracts valued at $100,000 or more.”51
The question of whether or not boycotts of Israel constitute discrimination based on national origin was addressed in Amawi v.
Pflugerville Independent School District.52 The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected that theory
and, as in Jordahl and Koontz, held that a state’s anti-BDS law did
not pass constitutional muster, largely relying on the right to boycott as established in Claiborne and on the facts that distinguish
this kind of case from FAIR.53 Like the Arizona and Kansas laws,
the constitutionality of the Texas statute as applied to state employees was rendered moot by the legislature’s subsequent modification of the law so that it no longer applies to sole proprietorships.54 Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to understand the reasoning
behind the district court’s ruling.

48. Jordahl, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1047 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1048.
51. Jordahl v. Brnovich, 789 Fed. App’x 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2020). The Pickering analysis
is not central to the thesis of this Article. The Jordahl court relied on the Pickering analysis
because anti-BDS legislation only applies to state contractors, so there is a potential issue
of government speech. This Article focuses on the impact the anti-BDS legislation will have
on general antidiscrimination laws—laws that apply to businesses regardless of whether
they are government contractors. It highlights the dangers that successful opposition to
anti-BDS legislation might present to the continued viability of these general antidiscrimination laws.
52. 373 F. Supp. 3d 717, 748–49 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
53. Id.
54. In late 2020, a lawsuit was filed claiming that the revised Texas statute remains
unconstitutional based on a strikingly different set of facts. Katie Hall, Former Travis
County Employee Sues Ken Paxton, Challenging Anti-Israel Boycott Law, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2020/12/24/formertravis-county-worker-sues-ken-paxton-challenges-anti-israel-boycott-law/4039691001/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/GYF9-DMHP]. Plaintiff is a former Texas county prosecutor who contributed
to a Texas state retirement fund. Pursuant to the requirements of Texas’s anti-BDS law,
the fund divested its holdings in the Norwegian financial services firm DNB ASA because
that company was on a list of businesses that advocate for the boycott of Israel. Id. The
Constitutional Law Center for Muslims in America is arguing that the prohibition on investment in that company violates freedom of speech and also constitutes an abandonment
of the fiduciary responsibilities of those who control these funds. Id.
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The plaintiff in Amawi was a speech pathologist who had contracted with a Texas school district to provide professional services
for school children.55 Upon attempting to renew her annual contract, Amawi was asked to sign an addendum that would have certified her compliance with the state anti-BDS law by acknowledging that she would not boycott Israel during the time in which she
was employed.56 Claiming that she had a First Amendment right
to engage in such a boycott, she refused to sign.57 Amawi and another similarly situated plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to dismiss the case.58
Like others that have addressed the issue, the Amawi court
noted that, with regard to the plaintiffs’ free speech claim, “[t]his
issue is one of dueling precedents”: Claiborne and FAIR.59 The
court applied a broad reading of Claiborne to include not only advocacy of a boycott, but the act of boycotting itself: “Thus, the desire
to not purchase certain products is distinctly protected in the context of a political boycott. Had the Supreme Court wanted to hold
otherwise—that only speech, association, and petitioning were protected, not the decision to withhold patronage—it could have done
so.”60
Further, the court rejected the relevance of FAIR, noting that
the Supreme Court did not treat that case as about boycotts and
pointing out that “the word ‘boycott’ appears nowhere in the opinion, the decision to withhold patronage is not implicated, and
Claiborne, the key decision recognizing that the First Amendment
protects political boycotts, is not discussed.”61 Further, the Texas
district court limited the Supreme Court’s holding in International
Longshoremen’s to the organized labor context, noting that in
Amawi, “[p]laintiffs’ BDS boycotts are not a labor union practice
coercing participation in industrial strife.”62

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Amawi, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 731–32.
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 746.
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In its discussion of the nature of the state’s compelling interests,
the court rejected Texas’s argument that its anti-BDS law was designed to prohibit “discrimination on the basis of national origin.”63
The court dwelled heavily on its view that the Texas law “singles
out content and viewpoint for restriction,” noting that “[t]he statute’s plain text makes its purpose obvious: to prevent expressive
conduct critical of the nation of Israel, not discriminatory conduct
on the basis of Israeli national origin.”64 The court supported this
point of view by examining the legislative history of the law. Although some legislators did mention the state’s desire to combat
“national origin discrimination against Israeli[s],” much of their
language did indeed suggest that the law was designed to protect
the political entity of Israel, and not its people, from discrimination.65 As the court further pointed out, even the State of Texas’s
own briefs in the case spoke of protecting an “ally,” not of protecting individual human beings.66 The court therefore concluded that
the law was an unconstitutional restriction on expression of a viewpoint and not a law aimed at preventing discrimination based on
national origin.67
In contrast to these other cases, an Arkansas federal court held
that a boycott of Israel is not protected by the First Amendment
because it is not “inherently expressive conduct” and that the
state’s anti-BDS law was therefore not unconstitutional.68 Relying
on FAIR, rather than Claiborne, the court said, “Like the law
schools’ decision [in FAIR] to prevent military recruiters from coming to campus, the decision to engage in a primary or secondary
boycott of Israel is ‘expressive only if it is accompanied by explanatory speech.’”69 The court explained that the act of refraining from
buying Israeli goods does not send any protected message because,
without further explanation, very few people would even understand that a boycott was taking place.70 The court dismissed the
relevance of Claiborne, stating that in that case the Supreme Court
63. Id. at 748–49.
64. Id. at 749. The court is perhaps careless in its use of language here. A better reference might have been to the “state” or “country” of Israel since that makes a clear distinction
between the political entity and the people themselves.
65. Id. at 750.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 754.
68. Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617, 623, 626 (E.D. Ark. 2019).
69. Id. at 624 (quoting Jordahl v. Brnovich, No. 18-16896, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31057,
at *4 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018) (Ikuta, J., dissenting)).
70. Id.

KAMINER 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

840

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

4/22/2021 8:53 AM

[Vol. 55:827

“did not hold that individual purchasing decisions were protected
by the First Amendment.”71 Finally, the court invoked International Longshoremen’s for the proposition that “there is no unqualified right to boycott or a constitutional right to refuse to deal, or
perhaps no First Amendment interest in boycotting at all.”72
Supporters of anti-BDS laws believe that they are an effective
tool to combat the economic, political, and cultural isolation of a
country and its people. These recently litigated cases all addressed
the constitutionality of such laws primarily from the perspective of
First Amendment jurisprudence, hinging on the courts’ interpretation of Claiborne, International Longshoremen’s, and FAIR. Focusing on the expressive rights of boycotters, they mostly ignore the
way that anti-BDS laws might fit in with other kinds of legislation
that also promote the purpose of discouraging or banning discrimination against certain classes of people. Since the act of boycotting
is simply a refusal to deal, it resembles the kind of acts prohibited
by antidiscrimination laws in more than superficial ways. As
courts increasingly begin to hold that commercial entities have expressive rights in other contexts, a real danger exists that they will
begin to view the limitations imposed by antidiscrimination laws
in a way that is analogous to their approach to anti-BDS laws.
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
This Part will trace the development of Supreme Court jurisprudence involving the conflict between antidiscrimination laws and
the First Amendment, specifically focusing on the right to freedom
of association. Until the 1995 case Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,73 involving the right of a gay
rights organization to march under its own banner in a parade, the
Court had been unlikely to hold that antidiscrimination laws violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association. However, the tide began to turn with Hurley and the subsequent Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,74 in which the Supreme Court relied on
its reasoning in Hurley in determining that the Boy Scouts could
not be required to provide membership to a gay scoutmaster. Yet
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 625.
Id. at 626.
515 U.S. 557 (1995); see infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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despite these decisions, antidiscrimination legislation continues to
prohibit commercial enterprises from asserting First Amendment
rights as a justification for refusing to do business with protected
classes of people.
Lower courts, relying on Supreme Court precedent, have distinguished between primarily commercial associations and primarily
expressive associations, with only the latter entitled to First
Amendment protection against antidiscrimination legislation.
However, in recent years, several courts have heard cases that
challenge this commercial–expressive distinction and instead support robust expressive rights for commercial entities that claim
that antidiscrimination laws violate the First Amendment.
A. The Early Supreme Court Cases
In the 1960s, cases challenging the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 did not focus on the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of association, but rather primarily challenged the
Act under the Commerce Clause. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States,75 and a companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung,76
the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power under the
Commerce Clause to enact Title II of the Civil Rights Act, which
prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, since the impacted businesses were sufficiently involved in interstate commerce.77 While some commentators have argued that Heart of Atlanta upheld Title II of the Act against a free association
challenge,78 the Court did not explicitly reference the First Amendment in either of these cases.
In the 1970s the Supreme Court began to more directly address
the conflict between the First Amendment right to freedom of association and antidiscrimination legislation, yet still continued to

75. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
76. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
77. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304–05.
78. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1217 (2014) (“Although we read Heart of Atlanta
today for its congressional-power holding, the Court also explicitly rejected a challenge to
the statute based on property, contract, free-association, and involuntary-servitude principles.”); see also Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After
Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1571 n.272 (2001).
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rule in favor of the validity of antidiscrimination statutes.79 In
Runyon v. McCrary, the Court upheld an antidiscrimination statute that prohibited a private nonsectarian school from discriminating against African American students.80 The Court explicitly recognized the right to freedom of association, acknowledging that
“parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to
educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable.”81 However, the Court nonetheless concluded
that forced integration would not harm this segregationist message.82 While it is somewhat difficult to understand how an integrated school could successfully advocate in support of a segregationist message, the Court was able to sidestep this issue since
none of the briefs in support of the school addressed this argument.83 The Runyon Court’s primary focus was simply whether the
antidiscrimination statute applied to private schools, and the
Court was therefore able to avoid fully analyzing the conflict between antidiscrimination laws and freedom of association.84
Throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court continued to
acknowledge the potential for conflict between antidiscrimination
laws and the First Amendment right to freedom of association.85
Yet despite this acknowledgement, in many cases the Court either
denied that an organization’s expressive associational rights were
implicated or applied a watered down version of the compelling interest test.86 In Hishon v. King & Spalding, the Court extended its
reasoning in Runyon to a case involving Title VII’s prohibition on
workplace discrimination.87 The Hishon Court rejected a law firm’s

79. The Court also began to address the issue of whether antidiscrimination laws violate the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Brown v. Dade Christian Sch., Inc., 556 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977) (addressing whether a school’s claimed religious beliefs supporting segregation violated the Free Exercise Clause), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
80. 427 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1976).
81. Id. at 176.
82. Id.
83. David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L.
REV. 83, 92 (2001).
84. The main issue in the case was whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited
segregation in the context of private schools. Id.
85. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court also more fully addressed whether antidiscrimination legislation violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding that the University’s free
exercise rights were outweighed by the government’s “fundamental, overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education”).
86. Bernstein, supra note 83, at 85.
87. 467 U.S. 69, 78–79 (1984).
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claim that it had a constitutional right to discriminate against a
female attorney who was being considered for partnership, but engaged in virtually no analysis, simply stating that “invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”88
While these earlier Supreme Court cases recognized the potential conflict between the right to freedom of association and antidiscrimination statutes, it was not until Roberts v. United States
Jaycees that this conflict became the Court’s primary focus.89 The
Jaycees, a leadership and networking organization whose purpose
was “promoting the interests of young men,” challenged the constitutionality of Minnesota’s Human Rights Act, a public accommodation statute that required the Jaycees to admit women as full
voting members.90 The Court upheld the Act, finding that it did not
violate the Jaycee’s First Amendment right to freedom of expressive association, since there was no evidence that the compelled
admission of women would change the message of the Jaycees or
that women would be unwilling to support the interests of young
men.91 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, emphasized that
the Act did not require the Jaycees to change their central purpose
of supporting young men, and that the organization would still be
permitted to deny membership to both men and women who refused to support this mission.92 Justice Brennan further determined that even if Minnesota’s law did cause “some incidental
abridgement” of the Jaycee’s expressive rights, this was justified
by the compelling state interest of “eliminating discrimination and
assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and
services.”93

88. Id. at 78 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)).
89. 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984). See generally Neal E. Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees,
34 CATH. U. L. REV. 901 (1985) (discussing how Jaycees is unhelpful precedent); Douglas O.
Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1878 (1984) (exploring the implications of the decision for other associations with restrictive
membership policies).
90. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627.
91. Id. According to Justice Brennan, the claim that the mission of the Jaycees would
be changed by the compelled admission of women as voting members relied “solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men and women.”
Id. at 627–28.
92. Id. at 627.
93. Id. at 624, 628.
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Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Roberts provided a different
rationale, distinguishing between primarily expressive associations and primarily commercial associations.94 She explained that
if the association is expressive, then the First Amendment protects
both its message as well as its membership since the “formation of
an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice.”95 On the other hand,
if the association is commercial, then it deserves minimal First
Amendment protection, and “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee
a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with
whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the State.”96 Justice O’Connor clarified that if an “association’s activities are not . . . the type protected by the First
Amendment,” it would be a commercial association.97 In other
words, if an association “enters the marketplace of commerce in
any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the
marketplace of ideas.”98 In providing this rationale, Justice O’Connor recognized that there could be close cases.
Justice O’Connor reiterated the commercial–expressive distinction in another concurrence a few years later in New York State
Club Ass’n v. City of New York.99 The majority in that case held
that the admission of women and minorities would not jeopardize
the expressive nature of large private New York City clubs.100 Justice O’Connor emphasized that such clubs are “[p]redominantly
commercial organizations.”101
While Justice O’Connor was unable to command a majority in
support of her position in either Roberts or New York, state courts
and lower federal courts did begin to rely on the commercial–expressive distinction.102 However, it was not until Boy Scouts of
94. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95. Id. at 633.
96. Id. at 634–35.
97. Id. at 635.
98. Id. at 636.
99. 487 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 13 (majority opinion).
101. Id. at 20 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
102. James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461,
466 (2015); see, e.g., IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that escort services are primarily commercial associations and therefore are not entitled
to First Amendment freedom of association rights); Storer Cable Commc’ns v. City of Montgomery, 806 F. Supp. 1518, 1560–62 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (holding cable television ordinances

KAMINER 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/22/2021 8:53 AM

CIVIL RIGHTS AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS

845

America v. Dale that the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the
commercial–expressive distinction.103
B. The First Amendment Trumps Antidiscrimination Laws
The Supreme Court first held that an antidiscrimination law violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutional as applied
in the 1995 case Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston.104 Hurley involved a gay rights organization,
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group (“GLIB”), that
argued that the Massachusetts public accommodation law protected its right to march in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade under
its own banner.105 The organizers of the parade, meanwhile,
claimed a First Amendment right to exclude GLIB from marching
since their inclusion would convey a message that the parade organizers did not support.106
In a unanimous opinion, Justice Souter held that the parade had
the right to exclude GLIB, based on both the expressive nature of
the parade and GLIB’s express purpose of marching under its banner “to celebrate its members’ identity as openly gay, lesbian, and
bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants. . . .”107 Justice Souter
emphasized that “under the First Amendment . . . a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”108 In
reaching this conclusion, he did not apply the compelling interest
test despite the fact it had been relied on by both the trial court
and the GLIB brief.109 Justice Souter also distinguished Roberts,
explaining that the inclusion of women in that case did not involve
changing the message of the Jaycees.110
Five years later, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme
Court relied on its reasoning in Hurley in holding that the Boy
did not violate the First Amendment right to association as applied to commercial businesses).
103. Nelson, supra note 102, at 466; see also Steffen N. Johnson, Expressive Association
and Organizational Autonomy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1639, 1665–66 (2001) (discussing the commercial–expressive distinction after Dale).
104. 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995).
105. Id. at 561.
106. Id. at 563.
107. Id. at 570, 572–73.
108. Id. at 573.
109. Bernstein, supra note 83, at 118.
110. Id.; see Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580.
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Scouts could not be required to provide membership to a gay scoutmaster.111 The Boy Scouts had challenged the constitutionality of
New Jersey’s public accommodation law which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.112 At the time, the Boy Scouts
taught that “homosexual conduct is not morally straight.”113 In a
5–4 decision, Justice Rehnquist determined that “the Boy Scouts
is an expressive association and that the forced inclusion of Dale
would significantly affect its expression. . . .”114 In holding for the
Boy Scouts, Justice Rehnquist explained, “Dale’s presence in the
Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send
a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”115 Rehnquist distinguished Roberts, determining that the
forced inclusion of women did not change the Jaycees’ message in
that case.116
The main dissent in Dale, written by Justice Stevens, opined
that forcing the Boy Scouts to provide Dale with a leadership position would not interfere with the Boy Scout’s message.117 Justice
Stevens distinguished Hurley, explaining that simply joining the
Boy Scouts is not on its own symbolic speech.118 According to Stevens, Dale’s participation sent “no cognizable message to the
Scouts or to the world. Unlike GLIB, Dale did not carry a banner
or a sign . . . and he expressed no intent to send any message.”119
The Dale majority implicitly relied on the commercial–expressive distinction, articulated by Justice O’Connor in both Roberts
and New York.120 The Court explained that the Boy Scouts had a
First Amendment right to be exempt from New Jersey’s public accommodation law because they were an expressive association.121
Additionally, Justice O’Connor’s vote was needed for Dale’s 5–4

111. 530 U.S. 640, 653–56 (2000).
112. Id. at 645, 647.
113. Id. at 651.
114. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 653.
116. Id. at 657–58.
117. Id. at 664–65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 693–95.
119. Id. at 694–95.
120. Bernstein, supra note 83, at 126–27.
121. Dale, 530 U.S. at 656. Some commentators have argued that the Court did not explicitly rely on this distinction. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 78, at 1231 (“nothing in the
Court’s analysis turned on the law’s application to a noncommercial entity”).
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majority, and there was no indication she had changed her position
distinguishing between expressive and commercial associations.
After Dale, lower courts regularly applied the commercial–expressive distinction in determining that commercial associations
did not have a First Amendment right to freedom of association.122
For example, relying on this dichotomy, the Third Circuit held that
the owner of a fraudulent tax business did not have a First Amendment right to freedom of association and could be compelled to provide a list of its customers to the government.123 Likewise, courts
have rejected freedom of association claims by a parking management company124 and a nightclub.125
Similarly, a number of legal commentators have relied on Justice O’Connor’s distinction in articulating why Dale does not generally threaten antidiscrimination laws. For example, Seana
Shiffrin argues that, for purposes of the First Amendment right to
freedom of association, there is “an important distinction between
social associations and business associations . . . that significantly
operate as parts of the competitive economy.”126 Likewise, Dale
Carpenter asserts that this commercial–expressive distinction
“preserves valuable associational freedom while saving antidiscrimination law from constitutional invalidation in the areas
where equality guarantees are most critically needed.”127
Yet other commentators believe that this distinction is both elusive as well as unfair.128 These critics contend that the distinction
is not meaningful since it is often extremely difficult to determine
if an association is primarily expressive or commercial.129 Many, if
not most, associations involve different types of activities. Justice
O’Connor somewhat conceded this issue in Roberts, explaining that

122. Nelson, supra note 102, at 467–68.
123. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 485 (3d Cir. 2005).
124. Int’l Parking Mgmt., Inc. v. Padilla, 634 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.P.R. 2007).
125. Rittenhouse Entm’t, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 861 F. Supp. 2d 470 (M.D. Pa.
2012).
126. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 839, 876 (2005).
127. Carpenter, supra note 78, at 1518; see also Nelson, supra note 102, at 467–68 (defending associational asymmetry from the perspective of identity formation).
128. Nelson, supra note 102, at 462–63.
129. John D. Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1435, 1450–54 (2012)
(opining that it is impossible to distinguish between commercial and expressive associations); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 812 (2001)
(explaining that commercial associations regularly engage in expression).
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“[d]etermining whether an association’s activity is predominantly
protected expression will often be difficult, if only because a broad
range of activities can be expressive.”130 Yet she also articulated
how this distinction could work and that ultimately an “association
must choose its market.”131
In addition to being elusive, commentators have also maintained
that the commercial–expressive distinction is fundamentally unfair, and that even if a line could be drawn between the two types
of associations, there is no valid policy reason for doing so.132 As
one legal commentator explained, “If commercial organizations are
just voluntary associations in which people join together to achieve
goals that they could not attain on their own, and if activity in
those associations is important to people both instrumentally and
intrinsically, why are they still disfavored as a matter of constitutional law?”133 As will be explained in the next section, courts are
beginning to rely on some of these arguments and in recent years
have been more likely to hold that the First Amendment protects
commercial businesses from the full scope of antidiscrimination
legislation. This evolution could have profound implications regarding the tension between free expression and the public policy
objective of eradicating discrimination in the conduct of business,
a conflict that might well be embodied by the issues arising from
anti-BDS legislation.

130. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
131. Id.; see also supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
132. Nelson, supra note 102, at 472–73.
133. Id. at 475; see also Bagenstos, supra note 78, at 1232 (“The more strongly one believes in the value of free association, the more likely one is to think that an exemption from
the anti-discrimination principle for even some classes of commercial business is tolerable.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy
Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000) (arguing that commercial associations, as well as
expressive associations, are entitled to freedom of association protection); Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1241 (2014) (arguing that all groups
should be entitled to the First Amendment protection of freedom of association); Robert K.
Vischer, How Necessary is the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403, 1412–15 (2012)
(opining that there are at least some commercial associations that are as deserving of constitutional protection as expressive associations).
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C. Cases Challenging the Commercial–Expressive Distinction
In recent years, various cases have arisen challenging the commercial–expressive distinction and supporting more robust expressive rights for commercial entities that claim antidiscrimination
laws violate their religious or First Amendment rights.134 One
group of cases, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, involve private businesses that refuse to provide
services, which they claim are expressive, to same-sex couples.135
The second set of cases, which include Hobby Lobby, involve forprofit corporations claiming that the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate” violates the right to the free exercise of religion.136 This related issue is premised on the principle that commercial entities have robust expressive rights.137
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a
Colorado baker who refused to design and bake a cake for a samesex couple’s wedding celebration based on his religious objections
to gay marriage.138 The couple claimed that the baker’s refusal to
make the cake violated the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act which
prohibits discrimination based on a number of protected categories, including sexual orientation.139 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy, in a narrow decision, determined that the Colorado
agency that had ruled against the baker violated the Free Exercise
Clause by showing hostility to religion.140 While one of the baker’s
central arguments was that Colorado could not compel him to bake
a cake since doing so would violate his First Amendment right to
freedom of expression, the majority limited its decision to the Free
Exercise Clause and did not rule on this issue.141
However, this case illustrates a recent legal development
whereby private for-profit businesses argue that their goods and
services are inherently expressive, and they therefore have a First
Amendment defense to generally applicable antidiscrimination
134. Bagenstos, supra note 78, at 1205.
135. Id. at 1232; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018).
136. Bagenstos, supra note 78, at 1233; see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682 (2014).
137. Bagenstos, supra note 78, at 1237–38.
138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
139. Id. at 1723.
140. Id. at 1724.
141. Id. at 1723–24.
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laws. Further, while Justice Kennedy did not rule on the free
speech issue, he recognized that private commercial businesses
might have a First Amendment right to be free from antidiscrimination laws, explaining that
[t]he free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who
have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation
as an exercise of protected speech. This is an instructive example,
however, of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning.142

In the aftermath of Masterpiece Cakeshop, a number of lower
courts have addressed the issue of whether commercial for-profit
businesses providing services they claim are expressive have a
First Amendment defense to antidiscrimination laws. These cases
have involved a florist,143 a wedding video company,144 and a website designer145 who were opposed to providing services for samesex weddings. These cases all represent an effort to chip away at
the commercial–expressive distinction and present a First Amendment defense to antidiscrimination legislation.
Second, there have been challenges by for-profit corporations to
the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby.146 In that case, the shareholders of a large family-owned corporation petitioned to be excused from paying for health insurance for the business’s
employees that would include the provision of certain kinds of birth
control.147 The family argued that forcing them to do so would violate their free exercise of religion under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act because the family believed that the use of
such birth control was a form of abortion and was, therefore, immoral.148 By upholding the right of the members of the family to

142. Id. at 1723.
143. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019) (holding that a flower
shop owner did not have a First Amendment free association right to refuse to sell custom
floral arrangements for a same-sex wedding in violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act).
144. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that videographers had a First Amendment right to refuse to make videos for same-sex weddings).
145. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (D. Colo. 2019) (holding that the
business owner did not have a First Amendment right to discriminate in violation of the
Colorado statute).
146. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
147. Id. at 688–91.
148. Id.
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run their business consistent with their religious beliefs, the Court
broke new ground in recognizing that certain fundamental rights
extend to people in the conduct of their commercial enterprises.149
Hobby Lobby differs from the other cases discussed in this section since it relies primarily on the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act and not on the First Amendment. Yet the reasoning of Hobby
Lobby only applies if there is no commercial–expressive distinction. As one commentator explained, “A crucial premise . . . is that
secular, for-profit corporations can be a vehicle for the religious exercise of their shareholders and that regulation of those corporations can thus violate rights to free exercise of religion. For the
mandate’s challengers to prevail, then, there must be no commercial–expressive distinction. . . .”150
This Part has traced the history of the Supreme Court jurisprudence involving the conflict between antidiscrimination legislation
and the First Amendment right to freedom of association. Until
Hurley and Dale, the Supreme Court was reluctant to hold that
antidiscrimination laws violated the First Amendment right to
freedom of association. In the aftermath of Hurley and Dale, lower
courts began to distinguish between primarily commercial and primarily expressive associations, with only the latter entitled to robust First Amendment protection from antidiscrimination legislation. Yet in recent years, cases have begun to undermine this
distinction, and there is now an increasing likelihood that antidiscrimination statutes will be found to violate the First Amendment.
The next Part will examine how arguments advocated by opponents of the anti-BDS legislation fit into this framework.
III. BDS LEGISLATION AND THE COMMERCIAL–EXPRESSIVE
DISTINCTION
This Part will examine how First Amendment challenges to antiBDS legislation could further erode the commercial–expressive
distinction and limit the impact of antidiscrimination laws. As explained in Part I, a number of commercial businesses have challenged anti-BDS legislation as violating their First Amendment
149. Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 315–16. In July 2020, the Supreme Court allowed an
extension of the kind of exemption granted to Hobby Lobby to include any employer with a
“sincerely held religious or moral objection” to the use of certain kinds of birth control. Little
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2373 (2020).
150. Bagenstos, supra note 78, at 1238.
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rights. Essentially, these plaintiffs argue that commercial entities
have a First Amendment right to choose with whom they will associate and with whom they will do business. These decisions have
relied heavily on the Supreme Court case law involving the First
Amendment and political boycotts and have not focused on the
commercial–expressive distinction. Yet as this Part will explain,
any holding that anti-BDS legislation is unconstitutional further
limits the commercial–expressive distinction and increases the
likelihood that antidiscrimination legislation will more generally
be found to violate the First Amendment.
A. Anti-BDS Laws as Antidiscrimination Laws
While the various state anti-BDS laws differ somewhat from
each other, these statutes essentially mandate that state contractors certify they will not boycott either Israel or others who do business with Israel.151 It is important to recognize that these statutes
only target commercial dealings and not advocacy. Businesses
clearly have a First Amendment right to speak out for a boycott,
and any attempt to limit peaceful calls for a boycott would be unconstitutional.152 Further, these statutes do not target what individuals can do in their private capacity; as private consumers,
business owners retain the right to participate in any boycott that
they choose.153
While these statutes are referred to as anti-boycott statutes,
they are in many ways analytically the same as antidiscrimination
statutes since a boycott quite simply is a refusal to deal with someone.154 For example, while anti-BDS laws sanction businesses that
engage in discrimination against Israel and those who do business
with Israel, the statute at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop sanctions
businesses that engage in discrimination against people based on

151. See supra section I.B.
152. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982).
153. It can be confusing to determine whether a sole proprietor is engaging in a boycott
in her private capacity or business capacity, for example, if a sole proprietor refuses to buy
an Israeli-made computer which she uses for both work and personal business. Recognizing
this, Kansas, Texas, and Arizona have amended their anti-BDS statutes so that they no
longer apply to sole proprietors. See supra notes 27–67 and accompanying text.
154. See David Bernstein, Everything You Wanted to Know About Anti-BDS Laws, Part
I, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 18, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/02/18/everything-you-want
ed-to-know-about-anti/ [https://perma.cc/8MFZ-UEDN].
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their sexual orientation.155 Similarly, federal antidiscrimination
laws prohibit discrimination based on protected categories, including race and sex, and Supreme Court precedent has made it clear
that businesses covered by federal law cannot refuse to deal with
African American customers156 or refuse to promote female attorneys.157 As one legal commentator explained, if businesses discriminated based on race or sexual orientation and then argued they
were “‘exercising [their] freedom of association to refuse to deal
with . . . contractors owned by African Americans, or ‘[they were]
boycotting contractors owned by homosexuals to protest same-sex
marriage’ they would be laughed out of court.”158
Opponents of anti-BDS legislation have not relied on Supreme
Court jurisprudence involving First Amendment challenges to antidiscrimination legislation, but instead have relied on Claiborne
v. NAACP.159 While Claiborne held that advocacy of a boycott is
constitutionally protected, it is unclear whether this protection extends to the actual boycott, the economic action itself, or whether
it only covers advocacy of a boycott. Opponents of anti-BDS legislation read Claiborne broadly and argue that its reasoning applies
not only to the advocacy of the boycott, but also to a commercial
business’s actual boycott or refusal to deal.160 In applying
Claiborne’s reasoning to commercial businesses, they are ignoring
the commercial–expressive distinction and advocating for robust
First Amendment rights for the for-profit sector.161 If opponents of
anti-BDS legislation prevail and commercial businesses have a
First Amendment right to boycott, this could threaten the validity
of most antidiscrimination statutes.
Interestingly, some vocal opponents of anti-BDS legislation have
vigorously supported other types of antidiscrimination legislation
against similar First Amendment challenges.162 For example, the
155. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act prohibited discrimination based on the following protected categories: “disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital
status, national origin, or ancestry.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a).
156. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 400–01 (1968).
157. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
158. See Bernstein, supra note 154.
159. See supra section I.C.
160. Id.
161. This was evident in Koontz, where the district court ignored the commercial–expressive distinction determining that boycotts, like parades, have an expressive quality. See
supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Opinion, For the ACLU, Antipathy to Israel Trumps
Antidiscrimination, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-the-aclu-a
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ACLU was on the side of the gay couple in Masterpiece Cakeshop.163
These same opponents of anti-BDS legislation have attempted to
distinguish anti-BDS laws from other antidiscrimination legislation. Yet, as the next section explains, none of these distinctions
quite work. Therefore, if these opponents of anti-BDS legislation
are successful, the impact will be to further limit the scope of antidiscrimination laws.
B. Attempting to Distinguish Anti-BDS Laws from Traditional
Antidiscrimination Laws
Opponents of anti-BDS legislation argue that the legislation differs substantively from traditional antidiscrimination laws in a
number of important ways.164 They claim that ordinary antidiscrimination laws protect broad categories of people—for example
prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, or sex—while
anti-BDS legislation focuses specifically on Israel and those who
do business with Israel. Therefore, they contend that this legislation is illegal content or viewpoint discrimination. Additionally,
they argue that unlike with other forms of discrimination, there is
no compelling or even valid government interest in prohibiting discrimination against Israel and those who do business with Israel.
This section will address these claims, explaining how none of the
distinctions are persuasive.
Opponents often argue that antidiscrimination statutes are distinguishable from anti-BDS legislation since these traditional statutes generally regulate economic behavior and apply to broad classes of people with the goal of providing equality of opportunity.165
This is often, but not always, true. For example, Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination based
on “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”166 Under Title VII
it is illegal to discriminate against, or boycott, both Muslims and
ntipathy-to-israel-trumps-antidiscrimination-11549928620 [https://perma.cc/72X5-EXHK].
163. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text; see also James Esseks, Reading the
Tea Leaves from the Supreme Court’s Cakeshop Argument, ACLU (Dec. 5, 2017), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/lgbt-nondiscrimination-protections/reading-tea-leaves-supre
me-courts-cakeshop [https://perma.cc/4QC7-7MBE].
164. See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, Laws Aimed at Silencing Political Boycotts of Israel are
Categorically Different than Public Accommodation Laws, BALKANIZATION (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/02/laws-aimed-at-silencing-political.html [https://perma.c
c/9KQL-48QJ]
165. See id.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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Jews, both African Americans and Asian Americans, and both men
and women.167 Similarly, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public accommodation based on “race,
color, religion, or national origin.”168 As with Title VII, it applies to
broad groups of people.
Yet there are also numerous examples of antidiscrimination
statutes that regulate economic behavior but do not apply to broad
classes of individuals. For example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) prohibits discrimination against employees who are forty or older.169 It therefore does not apply to employees regardless of age, but only prohibits discrimination against
employees of specific ages. Regardless of the term used, it is legal
under ADEA to “boycott” or “refuse to deal with” or “discriminate”
against employees who are less than forty years of age. Various
state laws are even narrower in that they have both upper and
lower age limits on discrimination. For example, in Indiana it is
only illegal to discriminate against or boycott employees between
the ages of forty and seventy-five170 and in Missouri it is only illegal
to discriminate against or boycott employees between the ages of
forty and seventy.171
The same is true of statutes that prohibit disability discrimination in employment. While the Americans with Disabilities Act protects a broad class of individuals since it applies to “qualified individual[s] with a disability,”172 many state statutes protect
employees with very specific medical conditions. For example, Vermont explicitly protects individuals who are HIV positive from employment discrimination,173 North Carolina specifically protects
employees from discrimination based on sickle cell trait and hemoglobin C trait,174 and Washington explicitly protects employees
with positive HIV or Hepatitis C tests from discrimination.175
These state statutes do not protect a broad class of individuals and

167. The term “sex” also covers discrimination based on sexual orientation or
transgender status. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
169. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 631.
170. IND. CODE §§ 22-9-2-1 to -3.
171. Missouri Human Rights Act, MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010, .055.
172. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
173. VT. STAT. tit. 21, § 495.
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1.
175. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.172–.174.
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thus permit employers to “boycott,” “refuse to deal with,” or “discriminate” against individuals with some medical conditions but
not others. Therefore, while many antidiscrimination statutes do
apply to broad categories of individuals, it is inaccurate to state
that all do or that broad application is always required for an antidiscrimination statute to pass constitutional muster.
A related distinction made by opponents of anti-BDS legislation
is that these statutes represent an impermissible content-based restriction since those opposed to BDS are singled out because of
their political positions.176 As one commentator argued, traditional
antidiscrimination laws “don’t care why someone refuses service—
as part of a political movement, out of animus, due to fear of losing
customers, or for no reason at all.”177 The problem with this argument is that it inaccurately presumes that all boycotters are doing
so to express a viewpoint.
Clearly some boycotters are participating to express opposition
to Israeli policies, but many others have non-expressive reasons for
participating in the boycott. As one commentator explained, “Companies may boycott Israel to curry favor with Arab states or out of
mere anti-Semitism. They may hope to avoid harassment from the
BDS movement or simply cave in to pressure from Palestinian
groups.”178 Perhaps the lack of viewpoint discrimination is most
evident in the case of Airbnb, which initially announced it would
not list rentals in the Israeli West Bank but reversed its position
in response to a number of lawsuits.179 Airbnb announced that its
initial decision to participate had been entirely apolitical,180 and
that it was opposed to boycotts of Israel.181
Similarly, legislators may have a politically neutral interest in
passing anti-BDS legislation. States have a valid interest in man-

176. See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 11, at 666 (noting that anti-BDS laws are contentbased by “singling out only politically motivated refusals to do business” with Israel);
Shanor, supra note 164.
177. Shanor, supra note 164.
178. Kontorovich, supra note 162.
179. Note, Wielding Antidiscrimination Law to Suppress the Movement for Palestinian
Rights, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1366 (2020).
180. See Kontorovich, supra note 162.
181. “Airbnb has always opposed the BDS movement. Airbnb has never boycotted Israel,
Israeli businesses, or the more than 20,000 Israeli hosts who are active on the Airbnb platform.” Update on Listings in Disputed Regions, AIRBNB NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://news.
airbnb.com/update-listings-disputed-regions [https://perma.cc/LY5C-8PU6].
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dating that contractors buy the best and least costly goods, regardless of the country in which they are manufactured. If the best
available software is made by an Israeli company, a state has a
valid non-ideological reason for wanting its contractors to buy that
software. Further, at least one commentator has argued that antiBDS legislation is content-based since it singles out only Israel and
does not apply to firms refusing to do business with any other country.182 However, this ignores the reality that trade laws regularly
treat commercial dealings with various countries differently without implicating freedom of speech.183
Finally, opponents of BDS legislation argue that these statutes
are substantively different from traditional antidiscrimination
statutes since they address no compelling interest184 or even a “legitimate antidiscrimination interest in suppressing BDS activity.”185 Yet it is unclear why all the numerous protected categories
in various antidiscrimination laws are somehow objectively more
worthy of protection. For example, a number of states explicitly
prohibit discrimination against smokers,186 and Connecticut prohibits discrimination against medical marijuana users187 despite
the fact that marijuana is illegal under federal law.188 New York
currently prohibits discrimination based on thirteen protected categories.189 Clearly, state legislators have significant discretion in
determining who businesses should be prohibited from “boycotting” or “discriminating against.”
Additionally, traditional antidiscrimination laws are regularly
extended to protect categories closely connected to traditionally
protected groups. For example, when sexual orientation is the protected category, courts have prohibited discrimination against
same-sex weddings, since these events are closely associated with

182. Shanor, supra note 164.
183. See Michael C. Dorf, Anti-BDS Laws, Anti-Discrimination Laws, Subjective Legislative Intent, and the First Amendment, DORF ON LAW (Feb. 25, 2019), http://www.dorfon
law.org/2019/02/anti-bds-laws-anti-discrimination-laws.html [https://perma.cc/29ME-E2W
R].
184. Shanor, supra note 164.
185. See Note, supra note 179, at 1369–70.
186. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40s; IND. CODE § 22-5-4-1; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2320.10-14; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292.
187. Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p.
188. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812.
189. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292, 296.
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gay and lesbian people.190 While race is a traditional protected category, New York has extended this by defining race as “traits historically associated with race, including but not limited to, hair texture and protective hairstyles.”191 Similarly, discrimination
against Israel is closely associated with Jews since Israel is the
only Jewish-majority country in the world, and the BDS movement
began at an extraordinarily anti-Semitic conference.192 Sixty-nine
percent of American Jews say they are either very emotionally attached (thirty percent) or somewhat emotionally attached (thirtynine percent) to Israel.193 These statutes also prohibit boycotts
against those who do business with Israel, which would include the
forty-three percent of American Jews who have gone to Israel.194
As this Part has explained, anti-BDS legislation cannot be fully
distinguished from other types of antidiscrimination laws that apply to the commercial sector. If opponents of anti-BDS legislation
are successful, they may ultimately limit the scope of antidiscrimination laws in the commercial sector—laws which these opponents, such as the ACLU, support. The previous Part explained
that there are already trends undermining the commercial–expressive distinction and providing commercial businesses with additional First Amendment defenses to antidiscrimination statutes.
Opponents of anti-BDS legislation are furthering these trends and
the end result may be to weaken antidiscrimination laws.
CONCLUSION
Opponents of anti-BDS legislation have advocated for a position
that is likely to undermine antidiscrimination norms that some of
these opponents, such as the ACLU, have supported for decades.
As this Article has explained, the Supreme Court historically resolved conflicts between antidiscrimination laws and the constitutional rights of freedom of association and expression with deference to enforcement of such laws in the commercial context.
190. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (2019) (holding videographers had a
First Amendment right to refuse to make videos for same-sex weddings); see also Dorf, supra
note 183.
191. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292.
192. See Traum, supra note 7, at 1029.
193. A Portrait of Jewish Americans, Chapter 5: Connection with and Attitudes Towards
Israel, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/chapter-5-connection-with-and-attitudes-towards-israel/ [https://perma.cc/C32A-5QK4].
194. Id.; see also Dorf, supra note 183.
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However, in recent years, numerous cases have been brought challenging the commercial–expressive distinction and supporting
more robust expressive rights for commercial entities, including
those who claim that antidiscrimination laws are unconstitutional.
If opponents of anti-BDS legislation are successful and the legislation is found to violate the First Amendment, this will further limit
the commercial–expressive distinction and increase the likelihood
that courts will find antidiscrimination laws more generally to be
unconstitutional.

